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THE PRESENTENCE INTERVIEW AND THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL: A CRITICAL STAGE UNDER THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING STRUCTURE
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and some-
times no skill in the science of law.. . . He lacks both the skill,
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
he ha[s] a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel
at every step in the proceedings against him.1
[T]here is no question that [the presentence investigation re-
port] is an important step in the proceedings in terms of the
consequences to the defendant. A defendant's conduct at the
presentence interview can have a significant effect on the sen-
tence recommendation in the presentence report, and district
courts rely heavily on the contents of those reports.. . . [A] sin-
gle finding by the probation officer can significantly affect the
ultimate sentencing range.2
Juan Carranza,3 a Mexican immigrant, was arrested and charged
with theft. Two years earlier, Carranza had been convicted of driv-
ing under the influence and had received a fine, which he paid.
With the assistance of counsel, Carranza arranged to plead guilty
to the theft charge. Prior to sentencing, the defendant was re-
quired to interview with the probation officer who would prepare
his presentence report. The judge would rely on the presentence
report in determining Juan's sentence.4 Because the probation of-
ficer refused to allow defense counsel to attend the interview, Car-
ranza faced the probation officer on his own. The officer asked him
whether he had a criminal record. Unaware that the fine he paid
for drunk driving constituted a prior conviction, Carranza an-
1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (emphasis added).
2. United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1990).
3. The name is fictional but the facts are based on an actual case in the Southern District
of California. Telephone Interview with Robert Swain, Attorney with the Federal Defender's
Office, San Diego, Cal. (Jan. 30, 1992) [hereinafter Swain Interview].
4. See infra notes 104-08, 112-16 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the
presentence report in the judge's sentencing calculation).
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swered, "No." When the probation officer later discovered that
Carranza had been convicted of driving under the influence, he
promptly increased the federal sentencing offense level by two for
obstruction of justice. As a consequence of his ignorance of the im-
plications of his previous contact with the police, Juan Carranza
received an additional six months in jail. Had his attorney been
present, Carranza likely would have avoided the sentence increase.
This story is one among thofsands. Every day defendants await-
ing sentencing in the federal courts must interview with probation
officers. The probation officers' reports prepared pursuant to these
interviews often result in variations of months or years in the de-
fendants' terms of imprisonment. In the past, when a stage of the
criminal proceedings presented the defendant with as much poten-
tial for harm as the presentence interview now does, the Supreme
Court held that the stage was "critical," giving the defendant a
constitutional right to have an attorney present.5
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that an accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel for his
defense. The Supreme Court has held that this right extends to
proceedings outside the actual trial. In fact, it attaches to every
stage of the criminal proceeding at which the rights of the accused
may be damaged by lack of the advice and expertise of counsel.' In
Mempa v. Rhay,9 the Court held that sentencing was a critical
stage in a criminal proceeding.10
5. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1967) (holding that a pos-
tindictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution at which the defendant was enti-
tled to the aid of counsel).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
7. See, e.g., Wade, 388 U.S. at 227-39 (extending the right to assistance of counsel to
pretrial lineups).
8. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); see also Wade, 388 U.S. at 225-26
(listing Supreme Court cases upholding the right to counsel because the absence of counsel
would unfairly disadvantage the accused's defense).
9. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
10. Id. at 134; see also Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (holding that
the presence of counsel would have prevented the imposition of a sentence based on
misinformation).
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The federal sentencing guidelines" (Guidelines) have deprived
judges of much of the broad discretion they previously enjoyed and
no longer permit them to consider a wide array of circumstances in
sentencing defendants. 12 Instead, the judge must sentence the de-
fendant based on certain facts deemed important by the Sentenc-
ing Commission and set forth in the Guidelines.' 3 Therefore, the
presentence investigation report that includes the vital information
has become increasingly important. 4 Judges, in fact, often rely un-
questioningly on these reports and the sentencing recommenda-
tions included therein. 5 An important source for the report is the
probation officer's interview with the defendant. At the interview,
11. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GuIDELINs MANUAL (1992) [hereinaf-
ter U.S.S.G.].
12. Julia L. Black, Note, The Constitutionality of Federal Sentences Imposed Under the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 After Mistretta v. United States, 75 IowA L. REv. 767, 772-
73 (1990) (discussing the goals of the Guidelines and the resulting decrease in judges' discre-
tion); Linda P. Campbell, Court Requires Judges to Give Prior Notice of Harsh Sentences,
CHL Tam., June 14, 1991, at C3 (indicating that the Guidelines have been criticized by "law-
yers and judges who contend that they leave courts with insufficient discretion to fit
sentences to individual crimes").
At a recent conference of federal judges at the College of William and Mary, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, Professor Paul Marcus asked an assembly of approximately 90 judges
if they favored the Guidelines; only one judge, a member of the Sentencing Commission,
answered in the affirmative. Paul Marcus, Panel Discussion at the Conference for the Fed-
eral Judiciary in Honor of the Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights (Oct. 22, 1991). The judges
dislike the Guidelines because the Guidelines restrict the discretion previously available to
judges at sentencing. Id. Judge Abner Mikva, Chief Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, expressed his dissatisfaction with the Guide-
lines, stating that the Guidelines are inflexible and attempt to quantify unquantifiable fac-
tors: "The notion that you can quantify human behavior is ridiculous." Judge Abner J.
Mikva, Remarks at the Conference for the Federal Judiciary in Honor of the Bill of Rights
(Oct. 22, 1991).
13. See Project, Twentieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Su-
preme Court and Courts of Appeals 1989-90, 79 Gso. L.J. 591, 1090-91 (1991) (listing spe-
cific factors to be considered, such as the defendant's role in the crime, his acceptance of
responsibility, and whether he attempted to obstruct justice).
14. Keith A. Findley & Meredith Ross, Comment, Access, Accuracy and Fairness: The
Federal Presentence Investigation Report Under Julian and the Sentencing Guidelines,
1989 Wis. L. REv. 837, 845 (1989).
15. United States v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1223 (8th Cir) (Bright, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 352 (1990); Telephone Interview with L. Felipe Restrepo, Attorney with
the Public Defenders Association of Philadelphia, Federal Court Division (Dec. 11, 1991)
[hereinafter Restrepo Interview].
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the probation officer may elicit facts that are capable of substan-
tially increasing or decreasing the defendant's sentence. 16
Not all probation departments in the federal system exclude at-
torneys from these interviews.1 7 In fact, many defender's offices are
on friendly terms with probation departments and have worked
out terms whereby attorneys are permitted to attend.' Such ar-
rangements, however, are informal. Many offices do not permit at-
torneys to attend"e and those that do may not be willing to rear-
range schedules and interview times to accommodate attorneys.20
As a result, many defendants face the interview without the assis-
tance of counsel.
Several circuits, ruling both before' and after 22 the enactment of
the Guidelines, 23 have held that the presentence interview is not a
"critical" stage. These decisions, however, do not adequately con-
sider the nature of the presentence interview under the Guidelines.
16. For example, the defendant may admit to selling additional quantities of drugs, lead-
ing to an increased sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3), or may receive a decreased sen-
tence under § 3E1.1 by accepting responsibility for her conduct.
17. See United States v. Saenz, 915 F.2d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1990) ("[Ilt is the practice
of the United States Probation Office for the Northern District of Ohio to allow counsel to
attend the presentence interview."). No rule prohibits counsel from attending the
presentence interview. United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 980 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 113 (1990).
18. The probation office in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is very accommodating in
this regard. Restrepo Interview, supra note 15.
19. See United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1432 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990)
("There does not appear to be a uniform practice in the Ninth Circuit with respect to
whether defendants may be accompanied by counsel at the presentence interview.. . . [I]n
the Southern District of California some probation officers permit defense attorneys to ac-
company their clients while others do not.").
20. In the Southern District of California, a hostile relationship exists between defense
counsel and the probation office. Swain Interview, supra note 3. One attorney in that dis-
trict stated that even after the decision in Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d at 1433, which man-
dated that probation officers honor a federal defendant's request that his attorney accom-
pany him at the presentence interview, the relationship between defense attorneys and the
district's probation officers remains antagonistic. Swain Interview, supra note 3. Defense
attorneys still must often fight to attend presentence interviews. Id.
21. See Brown v. Butler, 811 F.2d 938, 941 (5th Cir. 1987); Baumann v. United States,
692 F.2d 565, 578 (9th Cir. 1982).
22. See United States v. Tisdale, 952 F.2d 934, 939 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Din-
gle, No. 90-5083, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26052, at *9-10 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 1991); United
States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 844-45 (7th Cir. 1989).
23. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
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The present federal sentencing structure creates a strong correla-
tion between the presentence interview and the defendant's ulti-
mate sentence. In light of the powerful influence of the
presentence interview, that stage of a criminal proceeding must be
considered a "critical" one at which counsel is required.24 The
Ninth Circuit has exercised its supervisory power to order that at-
torneys be permitted to attend presentence interviews.25 Although
it determined that the presentence interview is not a critical
stage,26 the Sixth Circuit has required probation officers to permit
defense counsel to attend interviews. These decisions represent
an improvement but still leave unprotected a great number of de-
fendants in the federal system. As long as counsel is not required
24. One defense attorney noted that, because the Guidelines are so complicated, the
presentence interview has become a trap for the unwary and uncounseled client. Swain In-
terview, supra note 3.
In addition to Sixth Amendment claims that the presentence interview is a critical stage,
several defendants have launched Fifth Amendment attacks on the interview process. See
United States v. Cortes, 922 F.2d 123, 126-27 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Rogers, 921
F.2d 975, 977-78 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 113 (1990); United States v. Woods, 907
F.2d 1540, 1543 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 792 (1991); Brown v. Butler, 811
F.2d 938, 940-41 (5th Cir. 1987). Under this theory, defendants have argued that under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), they have a constitutional right to be advised
before initiation of the interview of their rights against self-incrimination and to an attor-
ney. Courts have almost uniformly rejected this argument on the grounds that a "routine
post-conviction presentence interview by a probation officer does not constitute the type of
inherently coercive situation . . . for which the Miranda rule was designed." Rogers, 921
F.2d at 979; see also Cortes, 922 F.2d at 126-27 (dismissing the argument that Miranda
warning is required); Woods, 907 F.2d at 1543 (dismissing the objection that the
presentence interview violated the right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel).
25. United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1437 (9th Cir. 1990).
26. Tisdale, 952 F.2d at 940 (adopting the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Jackson,
886 F.2d at 844-45, that the presentence interview is not a critical stage because the proba-
tion officer does not act on behalf of the prosecution). The Sixth Circuit had previously
signalled that it would extend the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the presentence
interview as a critical stage. United States v. Saenz, 915 F.2d 1046, 1048 (6th Cir. 1990)
("[W]e would be inclined to reject the view of some courts that a defendant's right to coun-
sel at his sentencing does not extend to the presentence interview because [it] is not a criti-
cal stage. . . ."); cf. United States v. Colon, 905 F.2d 580, 588 (2d Cir. 1990) (listing factors
that have increased the importance of the presentence interview and militate in favor of a
determination that the interview is a critical stage).
27. Tisdale, 952 F.2d at 940. The court stated the rule as follows: "If a defendant requests
the presence of counsel-or if an attorney indicates that his client is not to be interviewed
without the attorney being there-the probation officer should honor the request." Id. This
standard places the burden on defense counsel to be sure that they inform the probation
office that defendants are not to be interviewed in the absence of their attorneys.
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for defendants at the presentence interview, 28 courts cannot ensure
that all defendants will receive fair and equal treatment at sen-
tencing. Courts will be able to protect the rights of defendants at
sentencing only by finding a Sixth Amendment right to an attor-
ney at the interview.
This Note addresses whether the presentence interview is suffi-
ciently significant to a defendant's rights to be considered a critical
stage of the trial-critical enough to require that the defense attor-
ney be present during the interview to advise his client and ensure
fair proceedings. After tracing the Supreme Court's development
of the constitutional right to counsel and discussing the refinement
and expansion of that right, this Note analyzes pertinent Supreme
Court cases to determine the elements necessary to qualify a stage
in the criminal proceedings as "critical." Following a discussion of
the nature of sentencing and the presentence interview prior to the
Guidelines, and the impact of the Guidelines upon the importance
of the presentence interview, this Note analyzes the presentence
interview itself. Finally, it argues that the interview is a critical
stage of the criminal prosecution at which counsel is required and
addresses the constitutional effect of a defendant's failure to re-
quest his counsel's presence at the interview.
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Development of the Right
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence. '29 In Powell v. Alabama,3 0 the Supreme
Court held that defendants accused of rape had been deprived of a
fair trial because
during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings
against [them], that is to say, from the time of their arraignment
until the beginning of their trial, . . .the defendants did not
have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as
28. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d at 1437.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
30. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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much entitled to [counsel] during that period as at the trial
itself.31
In addition, the Court held that the state court failed to accord the
defendants the right to counsel "in any substantial sense" 32 be-
cause counsel did not have time to prepare the case before the trial
took place. 33
Given the circumstances-poor, illiterate defendants and an
openly hostile public-the Court held that the state had an obliga-
tion to provide counsel. 4 The Court went on to state that the right
to counsel in capital cases is of such a fundamental character that
it should be embraced within the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 5 Powell was the genesis of the Supreme
Court's development of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Not until Gideon v. Wainwright,"6 however, did the Court hold
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel and, accordingly, required the states to make
appointed counsel available to indigent defendants in all criminal
prosecutions.37 Since Gideon, the Court has recognized that the
Sixth Amendment applies in all criminal prosecutions that may re-
sult in imprisonment.3 " The right to counsel, however, does not at-
tach until the initiation of formal adversarial judicial proceed-
ings.3 Once attached, the right to counsel is guaranteed through
31. Id. at 57.
32. Id. at 58.
33. Id. at 59 ("[A] defendant, charged with a serious crime, must not be stripped of his
right to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and prepare his defense.").
34. Id. at 71 (stating that the failure to provide the defendants with counsel under such
circumstances was a denial of due process).
35. Id.
36. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
37. Id. at 344 (recognizing that any person summoned into court who cannot afford a
lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial unless he is provided the assistance of counsel).
38. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (adopting "actual imprisonment as the
line defining the constitutional right to the appointment of counsel"); Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (stating that no person may be imprisoned as the result of any
criminal prosecution, including misdemeanor prosecutions, in which he was denied represen-
tation by counsel at trial).
39. In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972), the Court ruled that a lineup held after
arrest, but before the initiation of any adversarial criminal proceeding, is not a stage of the
prosecution, and therefore, the right to counsel does not attach.
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sentencing.40 Due process requires that counsel be available at all
"critical stages" of the proceedings.41
In United States v. Wade,42 the Court articulated the standard
for determining whether a particular stage is "critical. '43 The
Court held that it was necessary to "analyze whether potential
substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular
confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that
prejudice. '44 Wade involved a pretrial lineup, and the Court's
analysis focused on the prejudice the defendant may encounter
when confronted by the forces of the State in pretrial proceedings:
"It is central. . . that in addition to counsel's presence at trial, the
accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the
State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, ...
where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to
a fair trial. '45
The Supreme Court has extended the right to counsel to a num-
ber of other pretrial and posttrial proceedings, holding that critical
stages of the prosecution now include arraignment,46 preliminary
hearing,47 postindictment interrogation, 48 and other- pretrial con-
frontations.4 e In Estelle v. Smith,50 furthermore, the Court held
that a pretrial psychiatric examination of the defendant conducted
in a capital murder trial was a "critical stage" of the criminal pro-
ceedings when the examining doctor later testified against the de-
fendant at the penalty phase of the trial. Finally, the Court held
40. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, 137 (1967); see also Golden v. Newsome, 755 F.2d
1478, 1482 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that the right to be represented by counsel is fully
applicable at a sentencing hearing).
41. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
42. Id. at 218.
43. Id. at 227.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 226 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
46. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961) (stating that a crucial defense would be
lost irretrievably if not asserted at the arraignment).
47. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10 (1970) (plurality opinion).
48. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977).
49. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980) (holding that federal agents' deliberate
elicitation of incriminating statements from the defendant, in the absence of his attorney,
deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
50. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
51. Id. at 470.
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in Mempa v. Rhay52 that sentencing was a critical stage of the trial
at which the defendant was entitled to the presence and assistance
of an attorney23
Elements of a Critical Stage
The Supreme Court has identified a number of elements that
must exist in order for a criminal proceeding to be deemed "criti-
cal." First, a critical stage must occur after the initiation of adver-
sarial proceedings. 4 Second, the defendant must confront either
the prosecution or the procedural system.5 Finally, the confronta-
tion must involve the possibility that the accused's right to a fair
trial,56 or other proceeding,57 will be harmed if he is forced to pro-
ceed without counsel.5 In other words, the presence of counsel
must be necessary to guard against the potential prejudice of the
proceeding. This final element is composed of two separate factors:
first, there must be a possibility that the proceeding will prejudice
the defendant substantially, or deprive him of certain rights; sec-
ond, the presence of counsel must help avoid the prejudice.59
The lay person is often incapable of interacting on an equal foot-
ing with veterans of the legal system, be it the judge, the prosecu-
52. 389 U.S. 128 (1967)
53. Id. at 134 (discussing the critical nature of sentencing in a criminal case).
54. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972).
55. Id. at 689 (holding that only after the initiation of judicial criminal proceedings do the
adverse positions of government and defendant solidify); see also United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) ("[T]he accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against
the State at any stage of the prosecution. .. ").
56. Wade, 388 U.S. at 226 (stating that counsel's presence is mandated whenever absence
of counsel might derogate from an accused's right to a fair trial).
57. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel also applies at critical stages in the sentencing
phase of criminal proceedings. United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 843 (7th Cir. 1989)
(citing Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134). A similar analysis applies to both pretrial proceedings and
presentence proceedings. Just as a pretrial proceeding is critical if it affects the accused's
right to a fair trial, presentence proceedings are critical if they affect the defendant's right
to a fair sentencing hearing. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) ("[I]t is now
clear that the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of
the Due Process Clause. . . . The defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of the
procedure which leads to the imposition of [a] sentence ...
58. Wade, 388 U.S. at 226-27.
59. Id. at 227 (finding it necessary to "analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to
defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help
avoid that prejudice").
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tor, the police, or the probation investigator.60 The criminal de-
fendant is frequently unable to assert his rights because he is
unaware of what those rights are. He may be equally unaware of
the legal consequences of his words and actions in the presence of
state actors.6 1
The defense attorney serves to educate his client about his rights
and to advise him of the consequences of his words and actions.62
Only the assistance of counsel protects the defendant from possible
overreaching on the part of government authorities and from the
defendant's own sheer ignorance of the legal rules.63 In order to
guarantee this protection, defense counsel must be present at any
confrontation at which the defendant may be seriously prejudiced
in his dealings with the state.
60. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) ("Even the intelligent and educated layman
has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law .... If that be true of men of
intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble
intellect.").
61. For example, admissions made during the presentence interview may result in a
higher Guideline range, provide a basis for upward departure, or undermine the possibility
of a downward departure. 1 PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 191
(Phylis S. Bamberger & David J. Gottlieb eds., 2d ed. 1992 Supp.) [hereinafter PRACTICE
UNDER THE GUIDEUINES].
62. Counsel can also help the client communicate with the probation officer and develop a
"rapport with the investigator that may increase the investigator's sympathy for the client."
Richard H. Kuh, Trial Techniques: Defense Counsel's Role in Sentencing, 14 CRIM. L.
BULL. 433, 435 (1978). Additionally, the presentence interview offers the defendant the first
opportunity to challenge the prosecution's version of the facts. William W. Wilkins, Jr.,
Observations on Judge Heaney's Study, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 145, 150 (1991). In order to
make the opportunity meaningful, the defendant's -attorney must be present. See generally
Powell, 287 U.S. at 69 (explaining the helpful role of the "guiding hand of counsel" at every
stage of the proceeding).
63. The complexity of the Guidelines makes the preparation of the presentence report
more difficult; accordingly, it takes much longer to complete. Julian A. Cook, The Changing
Role of the Probation Officer in the Federal Court, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 112, 115 (1991).
As one commentary noted, "[P]robation officers have become the federal criminal justice
system's 'guidelines experts.' " Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Judicial Im-
pressions of the Sentencing Guidelines, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 94, 96 (1989). One can
hardly expect the defendant to comprehend the application of the Guidelines and their po-
tential for prejudice to the defendant.
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THE FEDERAL SENTENCING STRUCTURE
The "Old" Indeterminate System
Until November 1, 1987, federal judges possessed broad discre-
tion to sentence offenders based upon a wide array of facts.6 4
Under this system, the sentencing court determined a maximum
sentence and the Parole Commission then determined the actual
length of the time served within this maximum term. 5 As long as
the judge did not exceed the statutory maximum, the defendant
could not appeal the sentence.6 The discretion of federal judges in
sentencing was "almost infinite. 6 7 The judge was permitted to
consider all relevant facts in the defendant's personal history, as
well as any other facts brought out in the presentence investigation
report.6 8 The court's sentencing determination was highly individu-
alized and depended on the defendant's background, the nature of
the offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. 9
The presentence investigation report under the indeterminate
sentencing system was "primarily an aid to the judge's exercise of
discretion. '70 The report included both the prosecution's and the
defendant's versions of the crime for which the defendant was con-
victed, a description of other offenses with which the defendant
64. Findley & Ross, supra note 14, at 840 (noting that the court's sentencing determina-
tion was highly individualized).
65. Id. The defendant was usually eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sen-
tence. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1984) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225],
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 3182, 3223.
66. Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36
UCLA L. REV. 83, 89 (1988).
67. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1938, 1941 (1988).
68. Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 578 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Ogletree, supra
note 67, at 1941-42 ("In Williams v. New York, [t]he Court affirmed the prevailing view that
the past life or particular habits of the individual offender are relevant to the sentencing
decision and rejected the idea that every criminal offense in a specific legal category requires
an identical punishment.").
69. Findley & Ross, supra note 14, at 840. "The thinking behind the old rule, as an Amer-
ican Bar Assn. report said in 1980, was that 'sentencing is a human process.' " Alan Abra-
hamson, Irving Heard Flurry of Sentence Appeals as He Left Bench, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1991, at B1. Judge J. Lawrence Irving, a federal district court judge in the Southern District
of California, resigned in September, 1990 because he believed he "could no longer impose
the rules in good conscience, particularly in cases involving youthful, first-time drug offend-
ers who were being sentenced to lengthy terms without the possibility of parole." Id.
70. Weigel, supra note 66, at 89.
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had been charged or convicted, and accounts of the harm suffered
by victims.7 1 It also contained a psychological profile of the defend-
ant and personal information about the defendant's family, health,
marital status, work history, and education.7 2 This information en-
abled the judge to impose a sentence tailored to the individual of-
fender."3 Although the information contained in the presentence
investigation report generally was extremely helpful to the judge in
imposing a sentence, he was not required to rely on it: "[The]
judge was not required to impose the maximum sentence or even
the recommended sentence [included in the report]." 4 In fact,
with the defendant's consent, the judge could impose a sentence
without a presentence report.75
Given this flexibility, the presentence interview under the old
sentencing regime arguably was not a critical stage of the criminal
prosecution." The defendant certainly could have benefitted from
the presence of counsel, but was less likely to suffer prejudice due
to statements made in the interview. The probation officer re-
corded the defendant's version of the crime, inquired into previous
criminal conduct, and otherwise elicited personal information
likely to be helpful to the sentencing judge. Nothing required the
officer to make any subjective judgments about the defendant or
71. Findley & Ross, supra note 14, at 841.
72. Id.
73. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (stating that a judge's possession
of full information concerning a defendant's life and characteristics is highly relevant, if not
essential, to imposition of an appropriate sentence).
74. Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 578 (9th Cir. 1982).
75. Weigel, supra note 66, at 89 (noting that in cases involving minor offenses judges
often imposed sentences without any presentence report).
76. Prior to the Guidelines, defendants argued unsuccessfully that the presentence inter-
view was a critical stage because the characterizations of the probation officer could
prejudice the defendant severely. See Brown v. Butler, 811 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1987);
Baumann, 692 F.2d at 578. In Baumann, the defendant alleged that "the probation officer
recommended an aggravated sentence ... because of the lack of remorse which he gathered
from Baumann's responses during the interview." Id. In Brown, during the presentence in-
terview the defendant told the probation officer that he had supported himself by travelling
across the country passing bad checks. Brown, 811 F.2d at 940-41.
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the offense." The officer merely put the facts in the report and let
the judge draw the appropriate inferences.
The United States Sentencing Guidelines
Because under the old sentencing system judges could choose
which facts to rely on in sentencing the defendant and base their
decision on a wide variety of different facts, the specific facts elic-
ited in the presentence interview were less important than they are
presently. Under the Guidelines system, the circumstances sur-
rounding the sentencing decision have changed drastically.79
The federal sentencing laws prior to November 1, 1987 were
based on a "rehabilitation model,"' 0 and the defendant was eligible
for parole after serving one-third of his sentence.8 1 The Parole
Commission was responsible for setting a release date when it de-
termined that the prisoner was sufficiently rehabilitated.2 The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the resultant Guidelines aban-
doned the rehabilitative approach.
Reasons for the Change
Several studies cited by Congress concluded that the rehabilita-
tive approach to sentencing was not workable.8 3 The Senate report
77. Susan K. Grunin & Jud Watkins, The Investigative Role of the United States Proba-
tion Officer Under Sentencing Guidelines, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1987, at 43, 46.
78. Id.; see also Charlie E. Varnon, The Role of the Probation Officer in the Guideline
System, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 63, 64 (1991) (noting that the probation officer no longer
serves merely as a conduit for the prosecution's version and the defendant's statement to
the court).
79. Findley & Ross, supra note 14, at 841-42; see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying
text (discussing the changes made by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
80. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 65, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C-KN. 3182, 3220-21.
81. Id. at 40, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3223. Prior to the enactment of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)), federal law
contained no general sentencing provisions; the law simply specified the maximum term of
imprisonment and the maximum fine for each federal offense. See, e.g., Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1-2711 (1988)).
82. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 65, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. at 3221 (tying
prison release dates to the completion of certain vocational, educational, and counseling
programs within the prisons).
83. Id. at 40 & n.16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3223 & n.16.
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on the Sentencing Reform Act stated: "We know too little about
human behavior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a routine
basis or even to determine accurately whether or when a particular
prisoner has been rehabilitated. '84 Under the sentencing laws then
in effect, however, judges were free to impose sentences based
upon their own notions of the goals of sentencing.8 5
The broad discretion afforded judges in sentencing and the lack
of any direction concerning the purposes of sentencing resulted in
two evils. First, different judges imposed widely disparate sen-
tences on similarly situated defendants."8 Second, the efforts of the
Parole Commission to alleviate the disparity in sentences contrib-
uted to another defect in the sentencing laws: no one could predict
with certainty how much time a particular offender would serve if
sentenced to prison.8 7 According to the Senate Report, the "system
encourage[d] judges to sentence with the parole guidelines in
mind, and it encourage[d] the Parole Commission to release pris-
84. Id. at 40, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3223; see also Mikva, supra note 12 (stat-
ing that asking the parole board to determine what a felon would do in the future was
unrealistic).
85. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 65, at 41, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3224
(describing discrepancies in judges' sentences). The legislative history includes a chart of
sentencing patterns in the Second Circuit that reveals sentences for bank robbery ranging
from a high of 18 years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine to a low of five years imprisonment.
Id. at 42-43, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3225-26.
86. Id. at 41, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3224; see also Black, supra note 12, at 769.
Studies have indicated the existence of some correlation between the race of the defendant
and the length of the sentence imposed. See D. Brian King, Sentence Enhancement Based
on Unconstitutional Prior Convictions, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1373, 1377 n.32 (1989) (citing
Lawrence P. Tiffany et al., A Statistical Analysis of Sentencing in Federal Courts: Defend-
ants Convicted After Trial, 1967-1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 369, 387-88 (1975) (finding the
mean sentence imposed upon black defendants with no criminal history to be 50% greater
than the mean sentence imposed on white defendants with no prior criminal record)).
"Troubling assumptions concerning race, ethnicity, economic status, and gender were often
at the heart of these disparities." Bruce M. Selya & Matthew Kipp, An Examination of
Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NoTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (1991). The Guidelines, by requiring judges to consider only facts that are
relevant under the Guidelines, and by requiring judges to state their reasons for departures
from the Guidelines, should help to relieve disparities based on race or other minority sta-
tus. See id. at 5 (stating that Congress strove to eliminate discriminatory sentencing dispari-
ties by adopting the Guidelines structure).
87. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 65, at 49, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3232.
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oners with its own purposes-not those of the sentencing judge-in
mind."8
In response to these problems, Congress passed the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984.89 The basic objective of the Act was "to en-
hance the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime
through an effective, fair sentencing system."9 To achieve this
end, Congress sought certainty, uniformity, and proportionality in
sentencing. 1 The Act created the United States Sentencing Com-
mission and authorized it to "establish sentencing policies and
practices for the Federal criminal justice system" 92 to meet these
objectives. The Commission's Guidelines took effect on November
1, 1987.93
The New System
The Guidelines established a determinate system of sentencing
in which the defendant's offense level and criminal history cate-
gory correspond to a sentence length on a sentencing table.9 4 The
offense level is calculated by determining the Guideline section ap-
plicable to the statute of conviction and determining the base of-
fense level within that section, as well as applying any appropriate
specific offense characteristics. 5 The Guidelines then provide for
adjustments related to: the harm to the victim;98 the defendant's
88. Id.
89. The legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act demonstrates that sentencing
reform was designed to address disparity and uncertainty in federal sentencing. Id. at 41-49,
reprinted in U.S.C.C.N. at 3224-3232.
90. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A3, at 4.
91. Id. at 4-5. Congress sought to achieve this goal through a system that imposes appro-,
priately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity. Id.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988).
93. In United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and the Guidelines promulgated
thereunder, against the claim that the Act violated the doctrine of separation of powers.
94. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1.
95. Id.
96. Id. §§ 3A1.1-.3 (considering the vulnerability of the victim, whether the victim was a
present or former law enforcement or corrections officer, and whether the victim was
restrained).
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role in the offense; e7 the degree of obstruction of justice by the de-
fendant;98 whether the defendant was convicted on multiple
counts;99 and whether the defendant has accepted personal respon-
sibility for the offense.10 Next, the judge must determine the de-
fendant's criminal history category. 1°1 Using these two figures, the
judge determines the applicable sentence range by referring to the
sentencing table.102 The judge may not depart from this range
without stating the reasons in open court.'
THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT UNDER THE GUIDELINES
The Guidelines now provide that "[a] probation officer shall
conduct a presentence investigation and report to the court before
the imposition of sentence.' 0 4 Congress deleted provisions of Rule
32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that permitted
97. Id. §§ 3B1.1-.3 (regarding the determination whether the defendant was an orga-
nizer, leader, manager, or supervisor, or merely a minor participant in the crime, and
whether defendant abused a position of public or private trust).
98. Id. § 3C1.1 (providing for an upward adjustment if the defendant willfully impeded
or obstructed the administration of justice during the investigation or prosecution of the
offense).
99. Id. § 1B1.1(d) (providing that various counts be grouped).
100. Id. § 1Bl.l(e); see Project, supra note 13, at 1090-91.
101. U.S.S.G. § IB1.1(f).
102. Id. § 1B1.1(g). The sentencing table's horizontal axis consists of 43 offense levels and
its vertical axis contains six criminal history categories. A defendant's sentence range ap-
pears at the point in the chart where his offense level and criminal history category inter-
sect. Thus, a defendant with an offense level of 21 and a criminal history category II would
be sentenced to 41-51 months in prison. See id. ch. 5, pt. A.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988). The sentencing judge may depart upwards when the de-
fendant's conduct resulted in a death, physical injury, extreme psychological injury, abduc-
tion or unlawful restraint, or property damage, or if the defendant used or possessed a
weapon, disrupted a governmental function, engaged in unusually cruel conduct, or commit-
ted the offense to conceal the commission of another offense. U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.1-.9. Down-
ward departures are possible when the defendant substantially aided the authorities, id. §
5K2.1, when the victim provoked the offensive behavior, when the defendant committed the
offense under duress to avoid a more serious harm, or suffered from diminished mental
capacity. Id. § 5K2.10-.13. Finally, the court may depart downward when the defendant
voluntarily discloses the offense to authorities and accepts responsibility for the offense in
instances where the offense likely would not otherwise have been discovered. Id. § 5K2.16.
104. Id. § 6A1.1 (emphasis added). If the court finds that information in the record is
sufficient for a meaningful exercise of sentencing authority, the court may waive preparation
of the report. Id.
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the defendant to waive the presentence report.10 5 Thus, the report
is now mandatory unless the judge explains, on the record, why
sufficient information for sentencing is already available. 106 Due to
its mandatory nature,0 7 the presentence report takes on added sig-
nificance for the defendant.
The nature and contents of the presentence report have also
changed dramatically under the Guidelines. Congress designed the
report to provide the facts necessary for the application of the
Guidelines.10 8 Thus,
[t]he most important facts in the report, those which have the
greatest impact upon the number of months to be served, con-
sist of facts in three sections of the report: the Offense Conduct,
the Criminal History, and [the] Offender Characteristics. The
report must set out these verified facts in a concise manner and
in such a way that judges may rely upon them as findings at the
sentencing hearing. 10
Information that constituted a large part of the old report, in-
cluding personal data and background information such as educa-
tion, employment, and health, 10 is now relegated to one section of
the new report.1 The result is that this information now plays a
relatively minor role in the sentencing decision.
105. Id. § 6A1.1 cmt.
106. Id. § 6Al.. As a practical matter, waiver of the report by the judge is unlikely to
occur. Because 90% of criminal defendants plead guilty, the record rarely will contain suffi-
cient information. See, e.g., United States v. Easterling, 921 F.2d 1073, 1078-79 (10th Cir.
1990) (involving a probation officer who provided a presentence report describing the of-
fense conduct as stipulated in the plea agreement; the court indicated it was "not convinced
that the report adequately reflected relevant conduct), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2066 (1991).
107. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.1 (stating that the defendant may not waive preparation of the
presentence report).
108. Grunin & Watkins, supra note 77, at 44 (outlining the information that is to be
included in the presentence report). Specified facts now have a reasonably predictable im-
pact on the sentence. Wilkins, supra note 62, at 148.
109. Grunin & Watkins, supra note 77, at 44.
110. See United States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488 app. B (D. Or. 1988) (displaying the
format of this information as contained in the old presentence report form).
111. DvsioN OF PROBATION, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PRESENTENCE INVESTIGA-
TIVE REPORTS UNDER THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984 (1987), reprinted in FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CTR., IN-CoURT EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM ON GUIDELINE SENTENCING ORIENTATION tab
H, at 37-40 (1987) [hereinafter REPORTS UNDER SENTENCING REFORM AT]; see also Belgard,
694 F. Supp. 1488 app. C (displaying the format of the presentence report after the
Guidelines).
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The probation officer must gather all the facts relating to the
offense and the offender, weigh the evidence in support of diver-
gent accounts, and arrive at a single version of the facts.112 This
subjective weighing was not required in the old presentence report,
which included both the prosecution's and the defendant's versions
of the offense."13 Using his interpretation of the facts, the proba-
tion officer then determines the offense level and criminal history
category and calculates the sentencing range applicable to the of-
fense." 4 The judge relies on these conclusions in determining the
sentence. Although technically not required to rely on the proba-
tion officer's recommendation," 5 the fact is that "due to the diffi-
culty of mastering this complicated and ever-evolving guideline
system, . . . the district courts have come increasingly to rely on
the recommendations of the probation officer who prepares the
presentence report.""16
Because the probation officer must collect and weigh all the facts
that go into the sentencing formula and then subjectively deter-
mine the set of facts that will be used by the judge in determining
112. See Grunin & Watkins, supra note 77, at 44; see also Varnon, supra note 78, at 63
("Judgments ... must be made by the probation officer to arrive at the statement of 'the
classification of the offense and of the defendant under the categories established by the
Sentencing Commission,' as required by Rule 32."). Although the probation officer is in-
structed to remain impartial, REPORTS UNDER SENTENCING REFORM ACT, supra note 111, at
4, his perceptions of the defendant are likely to affect, consciously or unconsciously, the
version of the facts he prepares.
113. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
114. REPORTS UNDER SENTENCING REFORM ACT, supra note 111, at 19-35, 53-54; Belgard,
694 F. Supp. at 1510.
115. WAYNE BARR ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK § 6.07 (1990).
116. United States v. O'Meara,, 895 F.2d 1216, 1223 (8th Cir.) (Bright, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 352 (1990); see John L. Carroll, The
Defense Lawyer's Role in the Sentencing Process: You've Got to Accentuate the Positive
and Eliminate the Negative, 37 MERCER L. REV. 981, 988 (1986) ("In the federal sentencing
system, the trial judge usually sentences on the basis of the [presentence] report and usually
follows the probation officer's recommendation."); Cook, supra note 63, at 113 ("The view of
the probation officer may, and probably will, have some influence upon the judge who must
decide whether to include or exclude two points in the guidelines calculation."); Stephen A.
Fennell & William N. Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of
the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1613, 1668
(1980) ("The concurrence between the probation officer's recommendation and the actual
sentence imposed in most cases underscores the federal courts' heavy reliance on the proba-
tion officer's expertise."). One defense attorney stated that judges rely on the probation
officer's recommendation "nearly 100%" of the time. Restrepo Interview, supra note 15.
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the sentence, the officer's assessment of the defendant in the inter-
view is crucial. This is particularly true when the defendant has
entered into a plea bargain and there has been no trial to develop
the facts of the case.117 Under the Guidelines, the presentence re-
port may also be used to assess the adequacy of the plea: "A judge
is required to reject a plea agreement involving a dismissal of
charges or a promise not to pursue other potential charges if the
remaining charge does not adequately reflect the seriousnesss [sic]
of the actual offense behavior."" 8 The judge has limited discretion
to consider facts other than those presented in the report, as the
facts in the report are keyed to the sections of the Guidelines he
must apply in arriving at a sentence." 9 Furthermore, departures
from the Guidelines are likely to be based on information in the
presentence report. 20 As one commentary noted, "[A]s important
as the [presentence investigation report] was to sentencing under
the old system, it is even more critical under the guidelines."'12'
Although judges are not required to rely on the probation of-
ficer's report, in fact it is often the final word in vital sentencing
determinations. As one judge noted in his dissent in United States
v. O'Meara,'22 "[I]t is a sad but true fact of life under the Guide-
lines that many of the crucial judgment calls in sentencing are now
made, not by the court, but by probation officers to whose techni-
cal knowledge overworked district judges understandably, but all
too often, uncritically defer."' 23
117. See Fennell & Hall, supra note 116, at 1627 ("[T]he report often substitutes for the
trial itself as a mechanism through which facts are found in a criminal case,... provid[ing]
the sentencing judge with his only knowledge of the offense and the defendant .... );
Findley & Ross, supra note 14, at 843 ("Especially in guilty plea cases, in which there has
usually been no development of facts at trial, the [presentence investigation report] is the
court's primary tool for making a sentencing determination under the guidelines.").
118. Ellen H. Steury, Prosecutorial and Judicial Discretion, in THE U.S. SENTENCING
GumELiNas 93, 107 (Dean J. Champion ed., 1989) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES] (cit-
ing U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(a)).
119. See id. at 96-102; Findley & Ross, supra note 14, at 842; Weigel, supra note 66, at
89.
120. BARR ET AL., supra note 115, § 6.07, at 68.
121. Findley & Ross, supra note 14, at 845.
122. 895 F.2d 1216 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 352 (1990).
123. Id. at 1223 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Alschuler
& Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 96 ("[P]robation officers have become the federal criminal
justice system's 'guidelines experts.' "). This opinion is confirmed by the statements of de-
fense attorneys in several federal districts. Telephone Interview with Steve Hubachek, At-
545
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In Mempa v. Rhay,'124 the Supreme Court addressed whether the
right to counsel applied to the determination of facts for sentenc-
ing in a scenario in which the sentencing authority was not neces-
sarily bound by the facts:
We were informed .. .that the Board [of Prison Terms and
Paroles] places considerable weight on these recommendations
[made by the judge and prosecutor], although it is in no way
bound by them. Obviously to the extent such recommendations
are influential in determining the resulting sentence, the neces-
sity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing
evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and
assisting the defendant to present his case as to sentence is
apparent.1 25
Because the recommendations made by the judge and prosecutor
in Mempa and those made by probation officers under the Guide-
lines system are analogous, the Court's decision stands for the pro-
position that defendants are entitled to the presence of counsel at
the presentence interview, a major step in "marshaling the
facts. '126 An attorney may help the defendant present his case to
the probation officer, as well as provide to the probation officer in-
formation that might otherwise go unnoticed. 127 Mempa provides
the groundwork for the determination that the presentence inter-
view, because it results in the report relied upon for sentencing,
demands the protection of the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel.
torney with the Federal Defender's Office in San Diego, Cal. (Feb. 7, 1992) [hereinafter
Hubachek Interview]; Swain Interview, supra note 3. In the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia, probation officers do not put their sentence recommendations in presentence reports.
Restrepo Interview, supra note 15. Instead, they convey their recommendations to the judge
in ex parte conferences. Id.
124. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
125. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
126. Id.; see also 3 AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-6.3 cmt.,
at 443 (Supp. 1982) ("[T]here are a number of useful functions counsel can perform at this
juncture: information can be marshaled, extenuating circumstances detailed, and the de-
fendant's views better articulated.").
127. Probation officers are likely to have substantial case loads and little time for other
than routine investigation. Counsel can be helpful in supplying data that probation officers
might otherwise fall to notice. Kuh, supra note 62, at 434.
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The Critical Role of the Presentence Interview in Sentencing
Proceedings
The increased importance of the presentence investigation re-
port in the judge's sentencing decision results, of course, in the
critical nature of the presentence interview. A defendant's de-
meanor and conduct before the probation officer is often a vital
factor in the sentencing recommendation."2 8 A judge's decision to
reduce a defendant's offense level for accepting responsibility129 or
to increase it for willfully obstructing or impeding the administra-
tion of justice' 30 will be influenced in large part by the presentence
interview. 3 Recognizing the vital role of the presentence inter-
view, the federal courts have addressed the need for counsel during
this stage.
United States v. Herrera-Figueroa
United States v. Herrera-Figueroa,3 2 in which the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that attorneys must be allowed to attend presentence in-
terviews, described the potential harm that a defendant may in-
cur by her actions at a presentence interview. The defendant in
Herrera-Figueroa was convicted of possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute. 13 3 A probation officer contacted the defendant
to conduct a presentence interview.13  At the suggestion of the
public defender, Herrera-Figueroa, who did not speak English, re-
quested that his attorney be permitted to attend the interview. 13
The probation officer refused to interview him in the presence of
counsel and the defendant then declined to be interviewed. 13 In
his presentence report, the probation officer stated that he was un-
128. BARR ET AL., supra note 115, § 6.07, at 68.
129. U.S.S.G. § 3El.1.
130. Id. § 3C1.1 (imposing a two-level upward adjustment if the defendant impeded or
attempted to impede the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing).
131. E.g., United States v. Barreto, 871 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that a drug
dealer's coyness and lack of candor in dealing with his probation officer was a factor in
disallowing a reduction of two in the offense level based upon acceptance of responsibility
for the crime).
132. 918 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1990).
133. Id. at 1431-32.
134. Id. at 1432.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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able to determine whether Herrera-Figueroa had accepted respon-
sibility, for the offense because he had not interviewed the defend-
ant;137 the probation officer therefore refused to give Herrera-
Figueroa the reduction for acceptance of responsibility.138 In lieu of
an interview, Herrera-Figueroa submitted a letter to the court
describing his personal and family background, admitting to the
crime, and expressing remorse, but the district judge, relying solely
on the report, refused the reduction. 39
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit declined to decide the case on con-
stitutional grounds, noting that the Sentencing Guidelines reduce
the trial judge's sentencing discretion and require the judge to sen-
tence largely on the basis of facts contained in the report. 4 0 In-
stead, the court used its supervisory powers to order that proba-
tion officers allow counsel to be present at presentence interviews:
"Whether or not the presentence interview constitutes a 'critical
stage' in the criminal proceeding for purposes of the sixth amend-
ment, there is no question that it is an important step in the pro-
ceedings in terms of the consequences to the defendant."'' The
court held that a defendant's conduct at the interview could have a
significant effect on the sentence recommendation in the report,
and that the district court relies heavily on the report's contents in
determining a sentence: "The presentence interview plays a crucial
role in determining the probation officer's recommended sen-
tence."' 42 These statements seem to support the conclusion that
the presentence interview is a critical stage at which the Constitu-
tion entitles a defendant to the assistance of counsel.
The Ninth Circuit's reluctance to confront the Sixth Amend-
ment issue, in light of its conclusions on the critical nature of the
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1432-33 (determining that Herrera-Figueroa refused to be interviewed at his
own risk, the court refused to upset the finding of the probation officer even though the
government had no objection to the reduction).
140. Id. at 1433-34 (" '[G]uided by considerations of justice' . and in the exercise of
supervisory powers, federal courts may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifi-
cally required by the Constitution or the Congress.") (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461
U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (citation omitted)).
141. Id. at 1434.
142. Id. (finding that a single determination by the probation officer "can significantly
affect the ultimate sentencing range").
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interview, is regrettable. Forcing probation officers to permit coun-
sel to attend is an inadequate substitute for a constitutional re-
quirement that the defendant's attorney be present. By placing the
burden on the defendant, the Ninth Circuit's solution to the prob-
lem leaves too many defendants potentially unprotected.
Possibilities for Prejudice
The methods by which a defendant potentially could prejudice
himself during the presentence interview include: obstructing jus-
tice;143 misrepresenting his record;"" and revealing prior criminal
conduct for which he was never convicted. 4 5 In conducting the in-
terview, a probation officer is entitled to seek information relevant
to these categories, which may then provide the basis for a signifi-
cant increase in the defendant's sentence. 46 The judge, lacking the
time to investigate such details, relies heavily on the contents of
the report. 47 As the court in Herrera-Figueroa concluded, "Given
143. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 3(h) (stating that "providing materially false information
to a probation officer in respect to ... presentenc[ing]" can result in a two-point increase in
the offense level for obstructing justice).
144. A defendant may be penalized for misrepresenting his record even though the proba-
tion officer has access to the defendant's FBI rap sheet and the defendant does not. Her-
rera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d at 1435.
145. The sentencing court may consider allegedly criminal conduct of which the defend-
ant has not been convicted. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. 2. Section 1B1.3(a) provides that
conduct relevant to determining the applicable guideline range includes, among other
things:
(1) all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or
for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable, that occurred during
the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation of that offense, or
in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense,
or that otherwise were in furtherance of that offense;
(2) . . . all such acts and omissions that were part of the same course of con-
duct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction;
(3) all harm that resulted from the acts or omissions specified in subsections
(a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object of such acts or omis-
sions; . ...
Id. § 1B1.3(a). When the defendant relates his version of the offense to the probation officer,
he is in danger of recounting facts that fall under § 1B1.3(a) and may be taken into account
in increasing the applicable Guidelines sentence. According to defense counsel, this is the
most dangerous section of the Guidelines to uncounseled defendants. Restrepo Interview,
supra note 15.
146. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d at 1435.
147. See Findley & Ross, supra note 14, at 845 (stating that Rule 32 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure "gives the [presentence report] a central role in the initial computa-
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the importance of the presentence interview to the defendant,
there is no justification for excluding defense counsel.' 1 48 The nu-
merous possibilities available for a criminal defendant to prejudice
himself during a presentence interview militate that it be consid-
ered a critical stage of the trial.
THE PRESENTENCE INTERVIEW AS A CRITICAL STAGE
In United States v. Jackson,'49 the leading presentence inter-
view case decided after the adoption of the Guidelines,'5 ° the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the Constitution did not mandate the right
to counsel at presentence interviews.' 5 ' The court determined that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied only at stages of the
prosecution, which the court interpreted to include only those
stages in which the defendant confronts the prosecutor or an agent
of the prosecutor. 52
The Seventh Circuit cited United States v. Morrison'5s and Ger-
stein v. Pugh15 4 to support its conclusion.'5 5 However, the decisions
of the Supreme Court in those cases are inapposite. Morrison ad-
dressed the scope of the remedy available for a violation of the
tion of guideline sentences. Likewise, the sentencing guidelines state that the [report] is the
initial tool for resolving factual disputes critical to guideline application prior to sentencing
....").
148. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d at 1435.
149. 886 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1989).
150. Before the adoption of the Guide.lines, several courts held that the presentence inter-
view was not a critical stage of the proceedings. See Brown v. Butler, 811 F.2d 938 (5th Cir.
1987); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1982).
151. Jackson, 886 F.2d at 841-45. Other cases have dealt with the issue in dicta or with
little discussion of the factors behind the decision to deny the right to counsel. See United
States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir.) (holding that the right to counsel does not
attach at an ex parte presentence conference and finding the adversary rationale "persuasive
in the case of a presentence interview"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 609 (1991); United States v.
Woods, 907 F.2d 1540, 1543 (5th Cir. 1990) (adopting, with no discussion of the impact of
the Guidelines, the holding in Brown that the presentence interview is not a critical stage at
which the defendant has a right to counsel), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 792 (1991).
152. Jackson, 886 F.2d at 843 ("Under the sixth amendment, the focus of the constitu-
tional protection of right to counsel relates to the adversary character of criminal proceed-
ings and the particular process involved.") (emphasis added).
153. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
154. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
155. Jackson, 886 F.2d at 843-44.
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right to counsel. 156 Noting that the defendant was not prejudiced
by the absence of her attorney, the Court held that dismissal of the
charge was an inappropriate remedy, even if the violation may
have been deliberate.15 7
In Gerstein, the Court considered the criminal defendant's right
to counsel at a preliminary probable cause hearing prior to place-
ment in pretrial detention.158 The Court held that appointed coun-
sel is not required at the preliminary probable cause determination
because the proceeding is limited in function and nonadver-
sarial.159 Importantly, the Court emphasized that the hearing-
would not impair the accused's defense on the merits at trial.1
6 0
Gerstein is consistent with other Supreme Court decisions' 6 ' that
emphasize the lack of prejudice in determining whether the right
to counsel applies.
In contrast to a probable cause hearing, a presentence interview
is replete with possibilities for prejudice to the defendant in the
sentencing phase of the trial. Therefore, neither of the cases relied
upon in Jackson suffices to establish the proposition that a "criti-
cal" stage must involve the prosecution or agents of the prosecu-
tion. Moreover, a survey of the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence reveals that the Court is far less concerned with the
adversarial nature of the proceeding than with the potential
prejudice to the defendant inherent in the proceeding. 6 2 A close
reading of the Court's Sixth Amendment decisions supports the
theory that the particular proceeding need not involve an adver-
sary in order to be "critical.' 6
After concluding that the proceeding must be adversarial, the
Seventh Circuit held that the probation officer is not an adversary
but rather a neutral fact gatherer and an "extension of the
156. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365 (noting that absent prejudice to the defendant, or a threat
thereof, the court has no basis for imposing a remedy).
157. Id. at 365-66.
158. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119.
159. Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 122-23 (noting that the sole purpose of such a hearing is to determine probable
cause for purposes of pretrial detention).
161. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
162. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 187-206.
163. See infra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
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court"1 '4 and that a defendant therefore has no constitutional right
to have counsel present at the presentence interview. 6 5 The court
drew this conclusion directly from Baumann v. United States'6
and Brown v. Butler,167 both pre-Guidelines decisions. The court
stated that the reasoning of these pre-Guidelines cases was still ap-
plicable, although it provided no support for this conclusion and
no analysis of the changes that had occurred under the
Guidelines. l s8
In Baumann, the Ninth Circuit held that the presentence inter-
view was not a critical stage, reasoning that the judge had wide
discretion in determining the sentence and could consider all rele-
vant facts in the defendant's personal history." 9 This discretion
rendered the lack of counsel "constitutionally insignificant.' '1 70
This is no longer the case since the enactment of the Guidelines,'
under which the judge must select from the Guideline
range-generally as determined by the probation officer-and has
limited authority to consider factors other than those set forth in
the presentence report. 7 2
Additionally, the court's findings that the federal probation of-
ficer is not an agent of the government, that he does not have an
164. United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 1989).
165. Id. at 843-44.
166. 692 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1982).
167. 811 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1987).
168. Jackson, 886 F.2d at 844.
169. Baumann, 692 F.2d at 578. The court in Baumann rejected the criminal defendant's
claim that Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that a psychiatrist's pretrial exami-
nation of the defendant was a critical stage because the psychiatrist testified at the penalty
phase of trial), mandated that the presentence interview be considered a critical stage. Bau-
mann, 692 F.2d at 577-78.
170. Id. at 578.
171. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the restriction of
the judge's sentencing discretion. The Ninth Circuit has since held that defense counsel
should be permitted to attend presentence interviews and noted the differences that the
advent of the Guidelines had wrought. United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430,
1433-34 (9th Cir. 1990).
172. See U.S.S.G. § 5A1.1; see also Baumann, 692 F.2d at 583 (Pregerson, J., dissenting)
("As a practical matter, the presentence interview with the probation officer is an important
and critical stage of the proceedings."). But see United States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 50
(4th Cir.) (stating that the judge still has discretion and responsibility for imposition of the
sentence and that the Guidelines do not shift responsibility to the probation officer), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 609 (1991).
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adversarial role, and that he is a neutral information gatherer for
the sentencing judge, were not based in fact. Failing to explain why
the probation officer is not adversarial, the court merely asserted
that he is not.173 Due to the adversarial nature of the presenten~e
interview and the probation officer's role in it, we should not so
blithely accept this proposition.174
Other circuits addressing the issue have, by and large, adopted
the reasoning of Jackson with little or no analysis of their own. For
example, in United States v. Rogers,'75 the Tenth Circuit ex-
plained that a routine presentence interview is not a critical stage
of the proceedings requiring the right to counsel. 7 The court pro-
vided no analysis of the Sixth Amendment issue, although it did
discuss the nature of the interview in considering a Fifth Amend-
ment challenge. 77
In holding that the Fifth Amendment did not require that the
probation officer administer a Miranda warning at the postconvic-
tion presentence interview,17  the court noted that "the pre-
sentence report process is familiar and predictable, and defend-
ants, having just gone through a trial, are represented by counsel
in most cases,' 79 and that "[c]ounsel will either know or can easily
learn the date of the interview, and there is no rule which excludes
counsel's presence at the interview."' 80 In at least one district,
however, probation officers did not allow defense attorneys to at-
tend presentence interviews until they were ordered by the courts
173. United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 1989).
174. See infra notes 221-32 and accompanying text; see also Restrepo Interview, supra
note 15 (stating that at least for defense lawyers, it is absolutely untrue that probation
officers are independent, neutral fact gatherers).
175. 921 F.2d 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 113 (1990).
176. Id. at 979 n.7.
177. Id. at 979-80. The court stated that the presentence interview is not prosecutorial or
punitive, but is essentially neutral in those respects: "The probation officer acts as an agent
of the-court for the purpose of gathering and classifying information and informing the
court in the exercise of its sentencing responsibility." Id. at 979. The court then cited
United States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488, 1495-97 (D. Or. 1988), for the proposition that
the role of the probation officer had not changed significantly after the enactment of the
Guidelines. Rogers, 921 F.2d at 980.
178. Rogers, 921 F.2d at 980.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 982.
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to do so,"8' and defense attorneys note that they cannot always
easily learn when the interview will take place."8 2
Likewise, the degree of defendants' familiarity with the pre-
sentence interview is questionable. Given the complexity of the
Guidelines, most defendants are unlikely to find the interview pro-
cess routine or familiar.8 3 Defendants may not know which facts
are important nor will they understand the impact their demeanor
may have on probation officers' recommendations.
Finally, the courts in United States v. Tisdale84 and United
States v. Dingle,'s5 two recent cases holding that the presentence
interview is not a critical stage, merely adopted the Jackson argu-
ment wholesale without independent analysis." 6
The Problems of an "Adversarial Nature" Requirement
The Supreme Court has outlined the essential standard for de-
termining when the right to counsel attaches: as long as the de-
181. In the Southern District of California, defense attorneys were forced to fight for the
right to accompany their clients to the presentence interview. Swain Interview, supra note
3. Until the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Herrera-Figueroa, two-thirds of the district's proba-
tion officers would not allow defense counsel to attend. Id.
182. For example, one probation officer went to the home of a defendant out on bail, and
conducted the interview there; defense counsel was not warned and had no way of discover-
ing that such an arrangement would occur. Hubachek Interview, supra note 123.
183. Most defendants are unaware of the potential consequences of the interview. See
United States v. Saenz, 915 F.2d 1046, 1049 n.2 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Given the significance of a
defendant's presentence encounter with the probation officer, we are unable to agree with
the Tenth Circuit that 'the presentence report process is familiar and predictable' and re-
quires no special constitutional safeguards.") (quoting Rogers, 921 F.2d at 980).
184. 952 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1992).
185. No. 90-5083, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26052 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 1991).
186. See Tisdale, 952 F.2d at 939-40; Dingle, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26052, at *9-10. The
Fourth Circuit had previously decided that an ex parte presentence conference was not a
critical stage. United States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
609 (1991). In Johnson, the court relied on Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), and
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), for the proposition that constitutional protections
need not be invoked in the absence of adversarial proceedings. Johnson, 935 F.2d at 50.
Moran and Kirby, however, do not support that proposition. Those cases held that the right
to counsel does not attach until after the initiation of adversarial proceedings. Moran, 475
U.S. at 430; Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90. The presentence interview clearly falls after such
initiation. In Johnson, the court attempted to extrapolate from the holdings of Moran and
Kirby the conclusion that counsel is unnecessary unless the proceeding in question is adver-
sarial. Johnson, 935 F.2d at 50. A close reading of Moran and Kirby reveals that such an
extension is not warranted.
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fendant's contact with the State presents a real probability that he
will lose rights or be severely prejudiced."' 1 The presentence inter-
view is analogous to stages in the criminal proceedings-a pretrial
lineup, for example-that the Court has found to be critical stages
at which an attorney must be present. s88 Both proceedings entail
the potential for prejudice to the defense.
In United States v. Ash, s9 the Court noted that the "extension
of the right to counsel to events before trial has resulted from
changing patterns of criminal procedure and investigation that
have tended to generate pretrial events that might appropriately
be considered to be parts of the trial itself."'9 ° In much the same
way, the presentence interview, as part of a changing pattern of
criminal procedure, might be considered part of the sentencing
procedure itself.'91 The Court went on to state, "At these newly
emerging and significant events, the accused was confronted, just
as at trial, by the procedural system, or by his expert adversary, or
by both."'192 The Court's use of the word "or" stresses that a de-
fendant confronting either the procedural system or an adversary
is entitled to the assistance of counsel. Under the Guidelines, the
presentence interview with a probation officer fits squarely within
the procedural system that the defendant is forced to confront.19 3
After all, the defendant cannot be sentenced properly unless he
187. See infra notes 206-20 and accompanying text.
188. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-24 (1967).
189. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
190. Id. at 310.
191. See United States v. Saenz, 915 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1990). The Sixth Circuit noted
that courts holding that the presentence interview is not a critical stage "treat the
presentence interview as divisible from the sentencing phase, . . . even though nothing in
the sentencing guidelines supports such a bifurcation." Id. at 1048. The court concluded
that "the presentence interview is an integral part of the sentencing phase of a criminal
proceeding." Id. at 1048 n.2.
In State ex rel Russell v. Jones, 647 P.2d 904, 906 (Or. 1982), a state case addressing the
role of the presentence interview, the court stated:
[T]he investigator informally performs for the judge a function, in part, which
would otherwise be performed by the judge as part of the formal sentencing
hearing. Functionally, the investigation is a part of the sentencing procedure.
A defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel to the same degree when
the judge seeks sentencing information from him in open court and when the
judge does so indirectly through the out-of-court agency of a probation officer.
192. Ash, 413 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added).
193. Similarly, the Court noted that a
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complies with this procedure. 94 The rationale of Jackson and its
progeny directly contradicts this interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.
Consistently applying a historical interpretation of the guaran-
tee, the Court "has expanded the constitutional right to counsel
only when new contexts appear presenting the same dangers that
gave birth initially to the right itself.'1 95 Those dangers are that
the defendant may be substantially prejudiced by proceeding with-
out counsel and that counsel may be unable later to remedy the
harm done. 196 The presentence interview presents the requisite
dangers-possible unfairness to the defendant and the improbabil-
ity of a future remedy.
As the Ninth Circuit noted in Herrera-Figueroa, if a proceeding
must involve an adversarial confrontation in order to invoke the
right to counsel, the defendant would not be entitled to counsel at
the sentencing proceeding because the sentencing judge is "pre-
sumed to be completely impartial"'197 and therefore is not the de-
fendant's adversary. However, the Supreme Court has held that 'a
review of the history and expansion of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
counsel demonstrates that the test utilized by the Court has called for exami-
nation of the event in order to determine whether the accused required aid in
coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary.
Id. at 313 (emphasis added). A defendant facing a presentence interview needs the aid of
counsel in coping with the legal problems inherent in the sentencing phase of the trial. See
supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
194. The Guidelines, in effect, make the presentence report mandatory by not allowing a
defendant to waive its preparation. See U.S.S.G. § 6A1.1. The Sixth Circuit stated, "Al-
though the presentence interview is one of several means for gathering information about
the defendant and his offense, the range of information that Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(2) requires
a presentence report to contain necessitates that [the] probation officer interview the de-
fendant." Saenz, 915 F.2d at 1049 n.2.
195. Ash, 413 U.S. at 311.
196. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961) (holding that arraignment is a
critical stage because the defendant may lose the opportunity to assert certain defenses if
they are not raised at the arraignment). In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the Court
stated:
We have outlined in Wade the dangers and unfairness inherent in confronta-
tions for identification. The possibility of unfairness at that point is great
.... The presence of counsel will significantly promote fairness at the con-
frontation and a full hearing at trial on the issue of identification. We have,
therefore, concluded that the confrontation is a "critical stage."
Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
197. United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1436 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990).
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defendant's constitutional right to be represented by counsel at
sentencing is based upon 'the critical nature of sentencing in a
criminal case.' "e198 As the Court in Mempa stated, the right to
counsel attaches at every stage in which "substantial rights" of the
accused may be affected. 9"
The determinative factor for finding that a stage in the criminal
proceedings is "critical" is whether the events during that stage
may substantially prejudice the defendant and whether the de-
fense attorney may avert such prejudice.0 0 Contrary to the hold-
ings of several circuits, the adversarial nature of the proceeding is
not a prerequisite to finding a particular stage critical.
In holding that a proceeding must be adversarial in order to be a
critical stage, some courts have cited cases that stress that the
right to counsel does not apply until after the initiation of adver-
sary proceedings.20 Kirby v. Illinois2°2 established the commence-
ment of adversary proceedings as the point at which the right to
counsel attaches. According to the Court, the initiation of such
proceedings
is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal
justice. For it is only then that the government has committed
itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of
government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a de-
fendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of or-
ganized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive
and procedural criminal law.20 3
198. Id. (quoting Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967)); see also Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) ("[Ilt is now clear that the sentencing process, as well as the trial
itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.. . . The sentencing is a
critical stage of the criminal proceeding at which he is entitled to the effective assistance of
counsel.").
199. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134.
200. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970). The Court in Coleman held that a
preliminary hearing is a critical stage and set forth the relevant inquiry: "The determination
whether the hearing is a 'critical stage' requiring the provision of counsel depends ... upon
an analysis 'whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the...
confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
609 (1991).
202. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
203. Id. at 689 (emphasis added).
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Kirby is often cited as the source of the principle that adversary
forces in the guise of the prosecution must be present in order for
a stage to be critical. 04 However, the Court merely held that the
start of adversarial proceedings, and not any time earlier, is the
point at which the right to counsel attaches.2"5 Every succeeding
stage-including the presentence interview-is part of the "intrica-
cies of criminal law."
Appellate courts confronting a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel at the presentence interview have misinterpreted
Kirby. By focusing on whether the proceeding was adversarial in
nature, the courts have ignored Supreme Court precedent. The pri-
mary criteria of the Court in determining whether a stage is critical
is the proceeding's inherent potential for substantially prejudicing
a defendant's rights, and the ability of counsel to avert such
prejudice. 06
Analyzed under this standard, the presentence interview clearly
is such a critical stage. As the court outlined in Herrera-Figueroa,
numerous possibilities for prejudice to the defendant inhere to
such a proceeding:
To the legally unsophisticated defendant, the presentence inter-
view-like any interaction with the court-may be an intimidat-
ing and confusing procedure....
Defendants who are not lawyers are not likely to understand
the consequences of their conduct at the presentence interview
if they are not accompanied by counsel ...
* .* Casual, ill-considered or inaccurate answers offered with-
out a full understanding of the potential consequences may re-
204. E.g., Johnson, 935 F.2d at 50 (citing Kirby for the proposition that a critical stage is
adversarial in nature).
205. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
206. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970). But see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
432 (1986) ("For an interrogation, no more or less than for any other 'critical' pretrial event,
the possibility that the encounter may have important consequences at trial, standing alone,
is insufficient to trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."); United States v. Gouveia,
467 U.S. 180, 190 (1984) ("[T]he right to counsel exists to protect the accused during trial-
type confrontations with the prosecutor."). However, both Moran and Gouveia dealt with
events that occurred before the initiation of adversarial proceedings. Additionally, the quote
from Moran must be read in context: the initiation of adversarial proceedings in addition to
the possibility of negative consequences at trial creates a right to counsel at pretrial interro-
gations. The presentence interview meets both of these criteria.
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sult in a substantial increase in the recommended period of
incarceration. °07
The role of counsel at the presentence interview can be critical. As
one attorney commented before the advent of the Guidelines,
"Many [defendants] are members of ethnic minorities, frequently
lacking in communicative skills and more frequently with problems
of comprehending anything terribly complicated. To send such de-
fendants in, without counsel at their side, for interviews that will
figure critically in the presentence investigator's report, is itself al-
most criminal."208s Under the Guidelines, the probation officer's
conclusions in the presentence report are accorded greater weight
by the court than they were previously.20 9 If, under the old sen-
tencing system, allowing a defendant to be interviewed without
counsel was "almost criminal," doing so under the rigid Guidelines
system is even more ill advised.21 0
Finally, the defense attorney cannot repair the harm resulting
from the interview. Although United States v. Wade211 concerned
a pretrial confrontation with prosecutorial forces rather than a
posttrial presentence interview, the case is instructive regarding ir-
remedial prejudice. In Wade, the Court was confronted with a pre-
trial lineup that arguably had tainted the witness' identification of
the defendant at trial.212 The Court's analysis focused on the possi-
bility that this taint had deprived the defendant of his right to a
fair trial: "We [must] scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the
accused to determine whether the presence of his counsel is neces-
sary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial. .. ,,213
Because the defendant was unable "effectively to reconstruct at
trial any unfairness that occurred at the lineup, 214 the defendant
may have been deprived of his "only opportunity meaningfully to
207. United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1990).
208. Kuh, supra note 62, at 435.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 94-103.
210. One attorney considered it malpractice for a lawyer not to attend the interview with
his client. Swain Interview, supra note 3.
211. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
212. Id. at 227-32.
213. Id. at 227.
214. Id. at 232.
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attack the credibility of the witness' courtroom identification. ' '215
Therefore, the presence of counsel was necessary to "avert
prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial. '216
Similarly, the presentence interview, if held in the absence of
counsel, is fraught with possibilities for prejudice to the defendant.
The answers to the probation officer's questions, along with the
words, actions, and demeanor of the defendant, may significantly
affect the ultimate sentence.21 7 The results of this interview may
derogate from the accused's right to a fair sentencing proceed-
ing.2 18 The defense attorney is unlikely to be able to reconstruct
the events of the interview to ferret out any unfairness that may
have taken place. Nor will counsel be able to repair the harm done
by the defendant's self-incriminating statements. Although counsel
may challenge the facts and conclusions contained in the report,219
a successful challenge to the probation officer's subjective conclu-
sions on the defendant's demeanor or acceptance of responsibility
is unlikely.220 The presence of the attorney at the interview is nec-
essary to avert possible prejudice to his client.
The Probation Officer's Adversarial Role
As outlined above, courts holding that the presentence interview
is not a critical stage of the trial stress that application of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires a proceeding of an ad-
215. Id.
216. Id. at 236.
217. United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1434-35 (9th Cir. 1990). An adjust-
ment of two points under the Guidelines may result in a significantly different sentence.
The difference can range from a reduction of zero to two months for a defendant with a
criminal history category of I and an offense level of three, to a reduction from life to 34
years for a defendant with a criminal history category of VI and an offense level of 38.
U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 117-31.
219. Both the government and defense counsel review the complete report and may offer
objections to facts or Guidelines applications they allege to be erroneous. BARR ET AL., supra
note 115, § 6.07, at 68. Matters that cannot be agreed upon are set forth in an addendum to
the report. Id.
220. See Lynne Goodstein & John H. Kramer, Case Processing and the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, in SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 118, at 11, 126 (noting that judges
view the facts set forth in the presentence report as immutable and rely on the probation
officer's interpretation of a case).
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versarial nature.221' Therefore, whether the presentence interview is
a critical stage of criminal proceedings depends upon the probation
officer's role in the sentence determination.222 Because some courts
have expressed the belief that the "probation officer acts as an
agent of the court, ' 223 and that a defendant's statements therefore
are not made to representatives of the prosecution,224 the pretrial
interview has not been held a critical stage of the criminal proceed-
ings. This analysis, however, rests upon the faulty assumption that
probation officers do not operate as adversaries.
Regardless of whether the probation officer is, in theory, a neu-
tral fact gatherer, most defense attorneys and defendants perceive
221. United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 843 (7th Cir. 1989). At the state level, courts
have held that allowing a defense attorney to attend presentence interviews will interfere
with the probation officer's ability to conduct the interview effectively. See, e.g., People v.
Burton, 205 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) ("[The presence of counsel could in-
hibit defendants from answering questions, which in turn could work to their detriment
.... "); State v. Knapp, 330 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) ("Having counsel
present at the interview might seriously impede the ability of the trial court to obtain and
consider all facts that might aid in forming an intelligent sentencing decision."). The Su-
preme Court considered this argument in the context of pretrial lineups in United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Court said, "[T]o refuse to recognize the right to counsel for
fear that counsel will obstruct the course of justice is contrary to the basic assumption upon
which this Court has operated in Sixth Amendment cases. We rejected similar logic in Mi-
randa v. Arizona concerning presence of counsel during custodial interrogation ...... Id. at
237-38. Similar reasoning applies in the case of presentence interviews. The attorney wishes
to help his client to receive the shortest possible sentence. He has no incentive to obstruct
the proceedings; doing so would actually harm his client's interests. See United States v.
Rodriguez-Razo, 962 F.2d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the presence of the de-
fendant's attorney would have resulted in full disclosure of prior convictions to the proba-
tion officer); Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d at 1436 (arguing that the effect of lawyer participa-
tion will be greater candor on the part of the defendant, not obfuscation).
Instead of inhibiting the defendant from answering, the attorney may be able to help his
client communicate with the probation officer. According to one attorney who specialized in
postconviction remedies, "[T]here are many reasons which favor counsel's presence [at
presentence interviews]. For example, counsel may assist in clarifying the legal status of the
case, its facts, offense behavior, and overall circumstances." Benson B. Weintraub, The Role
of Defense Counsel at Sentencing, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1987, at 25, 25. In addition, the
American Bar Association has commented that "it has been observed that the presence of
counsel can establish a better rapport and thus increase the flow of information." Id. (citing
3 AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, supra note 126, § 18-6.3 cmt., at 443).
222. Jackson, 886 F.2d at 844.
223. E.g., United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 979 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
113 (1990).
224. Jackson, 886 F.2d at 842 n.4.
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the probation officer as an arm of the prosecution.225 After all, the
probation officer is responsible for: uncovering the defendant's
criminal history; determining whether the defendant truly has ac-
cepted responsibility for the crime 2" and whether the crime in-
volved more drugs than the amount for which the defendant was
225. Swain Interview, supra note 3. In fact, one attorney noted that he would rather have
his client talk to the prosecutor than to a probation officer because "at least prosecutors are
charged with certain ethical duties." Hubachek Interview, supra note 123. One commentator
described the changes in defendants' perceptions of the probation officer's role after the
enactment of the Guidelines:
Historically, the probation officer was viewed by many defendants as a friend,
a confidante, and someone who had the proverbial "ear" of the sentencing
judge. That relationship, in may ways, has been severely impaired by the re-
sponsibilities placed upon the probation officer under the Act. Today, because
of their perceived role as an adversary in the sentencing process, probation
officers are viewed by some defendants when they appear in the probation of-
fice for the requisite presentence interview, as working on behalf of the attor-
ney for the government.
Cook, supra note 63, at 113; see also Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 96 (noting
that the Guidelines have transformed the role of probation officers in the sentencing pro-
cess, making them more like lawyers); cf. Jones v. Cardwell, 588 F.2d 279, 282 (9th Cir.
1978) (discussing the objectives of the probation officer and the officer's relation to the pros-
ecution), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 965 (1979).
226. Many defendants believe that to receive the point reduction for acceptance of re-
sponsibility, they must confess to crimes for which they were never convicted or to which
they did not plead guilty, and which may be unrelated to the crime for which they are being
sentenced. See Jones, 588 F.2d at 281 (involving a defendant who, while being interviewed
by a probation officer for the presentence report, confessed to many other rapes and burgla-
ries of which he had not been found guilty, and as a result received a 99-year sentence for
rape). The circuits are split as to the scope of criminal conduct a defendant must accept
before being awarded a reduction. Compare United States v. Piper, 918 F.2d 839, 841 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that for a defendant to merit a reduction for acceptance of responsibil-
ity, he "must show contrition for the crime of which he was convicted, but he need not
accept blame for all crimes of which he may be accused") and United States v. Perez-
Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 459 (1st Cir. 1989) (concluding that acceptance of personal responsi-
bility for "criminal conduct" means the criminal conduct to which the defendant pleads
guilty and not all of his criminal conduct) with United States v. Mourning, 914 F.2d 699,
705 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a criminal defendant must accept responsibility for all of
his relevant criminal conduct before he is entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsi-
bility) and United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir.) (holding that for the reduc-
tion under the Guidelines to apply, the defendant must first accept responsibility for all his
criminal conduct), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131 (1990). By hinting that doing so will be ad-
vantageous to the defendant, probation officers may encourage defendants to reveal every-
thing. Hubachek Interview, supra note 123. The result may be an increase in offense level
related to relevant conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. By assisting his client in providing the
necessary information, a defense attorney can prevent the inclusion of unnecessary damag-
ing information. Restrepo Interview, supra note 15.
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convicted; and ascertaining the defendant's role in the crime.
227
Not surprisingly, this type of questioning leads the defendant to
believe that the probation officer's efforts are designed to recom-
mend the highest possible sentence.
This is not to suggest that, in general, probation officers are less
than scrupulous in maintaining objectivity. It is important, how-
ever, that they attempt to remain unbiased.228 In practice, unfortu-
nately, abuses sometimes do occur. For example, commentators
have noted that "the insular relationship of the probation officer
and the sentencing judge may. . . provide[] an opportunity for the
probation officer to abuse his control of information.212 9 In addi-
tion to attempting to withhold or deliberately reveal facts in the
report, the probation officer may adopt a pro-State slant. For ex-
ample, "the probation officer may rely excessively on the prosecu-
tor's files for information. 2 30 In fact, instructions from the Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts on how to prepare a
presentence report state that "[m]ost of the essential offense data
may be found in the U.S. attorney's file."' 23 ' Because the probation
officer has a close working relationship with the prosecutor, the
probation officer is more familiar with the prosecution's point of
view. Although incidents of probation officer misconduct may be
227. The presentence investigation reports under the Guidelines make clear the probation
officer's responsibility to present the relevant conduct of the defendant, including aggravat-
ing factors such as the purity or additional amounts of drugs involved in the offense. United
States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488, 1509 (D. Or. 1988).
228. Grunin & Watkins, supra note 77, at 47 (noting that the probation officer's "single
most important objective [is] . ..[t]o remain independent and unbiased in the adversarial
process and to provide the court with thoroughly verified information").
229. Fennell & Hall, supra note 116, at 1669. One probation officer "included in the rec-
ommendation section a statement that 'the defendant bragged in prison that he would be
out on the street in a few days.' [The probation officer] admitted that the statement, while
true, had been included specifically to provoke the judge into incarcerating the individual."
Id. at 1670 n.227.
230. Peter B. Pope, How Unreliable Factfinding Can Undermine Sentencing Guidelines,
95 YALE L.J. 1258, 1277 (1986); see also Goodstein & Kramer, supra note 220, at 125
(describing how "in one district, there are already indications that probation officers who
are reluctant to exercise much discretion in interpreting information are turning to prosecu-
tors to aid them in making relevant guidelines determinations"). These files contain facts
which, though collected by an adversarial party, may never have been proved in adversarial
proceedings. Pope, supra, at 1277.
231. REPORTS UNDER SENTENCING REFORM ACT, supra note 111, at 1509.
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isolated, a real danger remains that the probation officer may be
less than impartial.
One cannot overstate the danger to the defendant when one sees
the harsh consequences that may result from even minimal proba-
tion officer bias, in light of the Guidelines' unforgiving sentencing
structure. For example, seventy-five percent of the adjustments
provided in the Guidelines are upward departures.23 2 Thus, most of
the information elicited from the defendant by the probation of-
ficer is adverse to the defendant's interests. Without defense coun-
sel present to advise the defendant when to invoke his privilege
against self-incrimination, the defendant may talk himself into a
longer prison term. Because the probation officer is more of an ad-
versary than a neutral fact gatherer, the presentence interview re-
sembles an adversarial confrontation. Therefore, even under a
Sixth Amendment standard that requires an adversial proceeding
to invoke the right to counsel, the interview should be considered a
critical stage of the prosecution at which the defendant is entitled
to the assistance of counsel.
The Probation Officer's Role in Plea Bargaining
The contents of the presentence report may also affect the
court's willingness to accept a plea bargain. The following example
illustrates the problem: Rodney Johnson233 was charged with jew-
elry theft. His attorney struck a deal with the prosecutor whereby
Johnson agreed to plead guilty to the offense, which carried a sen-
tence of zero to six months. Under this bargain, Johnson based his
plea on the sentence the charge carried. His attorney wanted a pro-
bationary period; the prosecutor wanted six months. Both sides
were prepared to argue to the judge. At that point, Johnson went
in for his presentence interview without his attorney. By the time
the presentence report was issued, the adjustments made by the
probation officer had increased the recommended sentence to three
years. At the sentencing hearing, the judge looked at the report
232. Of the twelve specific grounds for adjustment of offense level enumerated in the
Guidelines, nine result in increases in the offense level and three mandate a decrease in
offense level. See U.S.S.G. ch. 3.
233. The name of the criminal defendant has been changed but the story is based upon
an actual case in the Southern District of California. Swain Interview, supra note 3.
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and asked defense counsel, "What are you complaining about? The
defendant is getting a break at six months," and sentenced John-
son to six months in jail.23 4
By stipulating certain facts, the prosecution and defense can fix
the sentencing range for a given charge. For example, if they agree
that the defendant will be charged with possession of five grams of
cocaine, that no firearm was found on the defendant, and that the
defendant has one prior conviction for possession, they can reach a
certain sentencing range.2 5 However, when the probation officer
conducts an investigation, he may discover additional facts that
will result in a different calculation of the sentence.23  Thus, the
probation officer can essentially vitiate any attempt by the defense
attorney to achieve a meaningful plea bargain.237 As one commen-
tator has noted, one
concern regarding plea agreements arises out of potential dispar-
ities between the relevant facts disclosed at the time of agree-
ment with those developed by the presentence report and re-
lated procedures .... The facts upon which the plea was
entered may therefore turn out to be significantly different from
those developed for the sentencing hearing. As a result, defend-
ants may make decisions on guilty pleas based upon inadequate
information and face far stiffer sentences than anticipated. 238
Because seven out of ten defendants plead guilty,"' the potential
for prejudice to the defendant is clear.
234. Id.
235. See Cook, supra note 63, at 113 (noting that the attorneys for the government and
defense may, in some instances, reach a settlement and purposely overlook material facts).
236. Id. ("On some occasions, the probation officer, whose responsibility is to uncover
relevant facts, may adversely affect the acceptance of the proposed sentence range by (1)
introducing newly discovered facts... or (2) calculating the criminal history category and
the offense level so as to recommend a higher sentencing guideline.").
237. Note, however, that "[d]isrupting plea agreements is not a function probation of-
ficers have solicited or unilaterally assumed." Varnon, supra note 78, at 63.
238. Weigel, supra note 66, at 94.
239. The Department of Justice reports that of 54,643 defendants in federal courts in
1989, 38,681 entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTCE STATISTIS - 1990, at 500-01. Of those convicted and sentenced from
October 1989 to September 1990, 87.7% pled guilty and 12.3% were convicted after trial. Id.
at 510.
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To a certain extent, this is a function of the continued coexis-
tence of plea bargaining and the Guidelines. Because the Guide-
lines require the sentencing judge to assure when charges are dis-
missed that the remaining charges adequately reflect the seri-
ousness of the actual offense behavior,240 the judge, upon reviewing
the presentence investigation report, may impose a much stiffer
sentence2 41 than that which the parties had agreed upon. Although
nothing, aside from abolishing plea bargaining,242 will resolve the
problem completely, permitting a defendant's attorney to attend
the presentence interview would enable him to exert some influ-
ence over the defendant's revealing additional facts. That influence
may well enable him to save a plea bargain for his client.
Waiver
The failure of courts to reach the Sixth Amendment question in
cases in which the defendant asserted that he was denied the right
to counsel at the presentence interview raises the additional prob-
lem of the impact of a waiver. In these cases, the attorneys were
not precluded from attending the interviews, but the defendants
failed to request the presence of counsel. 4 The courts have held
that a defendant waives the right to counsel by failing to object to
the attorney's absence. 44 Before finding that a defendant has
waived a right, however, a court must first determine what sort of
right he has waived. If the presentence interview is a critical stage,
then holding that a defendant's failure to object to counsel's ab-
240. U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(a).
241. The sentence would be based upon additional facts included in the presentence re-
port. See Varnon, supra note 78, at 64 ("[I]t is not contemplated that the lawyers will, by
agreement, be permitted to eliminate relevant information.") (quoting REPORTS UNDER SEN-
TENCING REFORM ACT, supra note 111, at 4-5).
242. Id. at 65 (noting that probation officers observe that Guidelines sentencing may not
be compatible with the charge-bargaining provisions of Rule 11(e)(1)(A) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and suggesting that eliminating charge dismissals would pro-
mote fairness and honesty in sentencing).
243. See United States v. Cotton, No. 90-5223, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22294, at *5 (4th
Cir. Sept. 24, 1991) (per curiam); United States v. Cortes, 922 F.2d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Saenz, 915 F.2d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Colon, 905 F.2d
580, 588 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Dickson, 712 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1983).
244. Cotton, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22294, at *5 ("In such a situation, even if a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel existed, it was waived.").
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sence effects a waiver of the right to counsel is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's waiver jurisprudence.2 4
As one commentator has noted, "[W]hether the sixth amend-
ment was violated more properly turns on whether the defendant
intentionally waived counsel at the interview. That counsel was not
precluded from attending is an insufficient basis to find a valid
waiver. 246 In Brewer v. Williams,247 the Court stated that its pre-
vious decisions had established the doctrine that "it [is] incumbent
upon the State to prove 'an intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right or privilege.'. . . We have said that the
right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant
and that courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against
waiver. ' 24s Under this standard, a defendant whose attorney does
not appear at the presentence interview and who fails to request
an attorney has not intentionally waived his right to counsel. No
Supreme Court case has held that mere silence on the part of the
defendant is sufficient to waive the right to counsel. 49 In fact, the
Court has held that "we presume that the defendant requests the
lawyer's services at every critical stage of the prosecution. '250
Courts must not avoid the question of whether a presentence inter-
view is a critical stage by claiming that the defendant has waived
his right to counsel.
In light of the potential prejudice inherent in the presentence
interview and the unconstitutionality of denying the defendant's
right to counsel, the important question becomes what burden to
place on the State. Currently, courts place the burden on the de-
fendant or her attorney to request counsel's presence.251 Because
245. See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
246. PRACTICE UNDER THE GuIDLINEs, supra note 61, at 192 n.50 (relying on Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403-05 (1977)).
247. 430 U.S. 387.
248. Id. at 404 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)) (citations omitted).
249. However, the Court has held that the State, by administering Miranda warnings,
made an accused-who waived his Sixth Amendment rights during postindictment ques-
tioning-sufficiently aware of his right to have counsel present at the questioning. Patterson
v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 293 (1988).
250. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986).
251. See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 2294, at *5 (4th Cir. Sept.
24, 1991) (per curiam) (finding that the defendant failed to request his attorney's presence).
The Ninth Circuit also placed the burden on the attorney and the defendant to insure coun-
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the presentence interview is a critical stage, however, the burden
should rest with the court and the probation officer to make cer-
tain that defendants are not interviewed in the absence of counsel.
Such a requirement should not prove unduly onerous. The proba-
tion department should be required to contact the defendant's at-
torney and arrange an interview when all parties can attend. If a
defendant appears for an interview without counsel, the probation
officer should refuse to interview the defendant unless the officer
ascertains that the defendant knowingly waives the right to the
assistance of counsel at the interview. 52 Should the probation of-
ficer fail to do so, the results of the interview would be constitu-
tionally tainted. Unless the government can prove that the absence
of counsel constituted harmless error,2 53 a court should order the
probation department to conduct another interview, preferably
with a different officer.25 4
POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR EXTENDING THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL TO PRESENTENCE INTERVIEWS
One of the primary goals that sentencing legislation should meet
is to assure that sentences are fair both to the offender and to soci-
ety.255 The offender, the federal personnel charged with imple-
menting the sentence, and the general public should be certain
sel's right to attend. United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1990); see
supra text accompanying note 28.
252. This procedure complies with the Supreme Court's requirements for waiver of a con-
stitutional right. See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404.
253. The Supreme Court recently clarified the harmless error standard for misapplica-
tions of the Guidelines. The Court held that the burden is on the party defending the sen-
tence to prove that the record indicates "that the error did not affect the district court's
selection of the sentence imposed." Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112, 1121 (1992).
254. If the same probation officer conducts the interview, he likely will be influenced by
his perceptions of the defendant at the first interview. Additionally, he may consciously or
subconsciously refuse to revise his previous recommendations. In one case, when the same
probation officer conducted a second interview of the defendant with counsel present, she
began by announcing that she would not revise her original recommendation regarding a
two-level increase for obstruction of justice "despite anything [the defendant] or his attor-
ney might say." United States v. Rodriguez-Razo, 962 F.2d 1418, 1421-22 (9th Cir. 1992).
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for another interview with a different probation of-
ficer. Id. at 1425.
255. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 65, at 39, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3222 (stat-
ing that fairness should be reflected "both in the individual case and in the pattern of
sentences in all [flederal criminal cases").
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that the sentence is justified under the Guidelines structure."' In
order to meet these goals, sentencing must rely upon accurate
facts. The Guidelines mandate disclosure of the facts that a sen-
tencing judge relies upon and explain exactly how the given facts
affect the sentence.5 This aspect of the Guidelines allows lawyers
to know precisely which facts are important. Sentencing under the
Guidelines will be only as fair as the facts are accurate. 5" In this
crucial area of the sentencing process-ensuring fair and accurate
fact gathering by the probation officer-the defense attorney
should play a vital role.
The presence of counsel at every stage in which the defendant's
rights may be compromised is an important part of ensuring the
accuracy of the facts used in sentencing. Due to the unquestionable
importance of the presentence report, which "if unchallenged, es-
tablishes the range of sentencing binding upon the trial court,"25 9
attorneys should have the right to guard against inaccuracy. Be-
cause of the critical importance of the presentence report, we must
require that the facts contained therein be accurate enough to
withstand any challenge. 210 Consistency 2 ' and fairness in sentenc-
ing, the original purposes of the adoption of the Guidelines, are
enhanced by permitting defense attorneys to participate in the
presentence interviews.
256. Id.
257. Goodstein & Kramer, supra note 220, at 124 ("[T]he number of months one must
spend in prison is inextricably tied to specific elements of the offense and the defendant's
criminal history."); Pope, supra, note 230, at 1282.
258. Findley & Ross, supra note 14, at 844; Pope, supra note 230, at 1282 ("No matter
...how excellent the 'substantive' legal rules ...and the social policies they embody,
specific decisions will go astray, absent competent fact-finding.") (quoting In re Fried, 161
F.2d 453, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 331 U.S. 804, and cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858, and cert.
dismissed, 332 U.S. 807 (1947)).
259. Weigel, supra note 66, at 95.
260. See Varnon, supra note 78, at 64 ("Given the close scrutiny so many issues receive
from the courts of appeals, probation officers must strive to insure that court adoption of
their recommendations does not result in reversal on appeal.").
261. Consistency in sentencing means that defendants with the same criminal history,
personal role in the crime, and acceptance of responsibility will receive the same sentence
provided these facts are equally included in the presentence report.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEFENSE PRACTICE
In the absence of a ruling that the Sixth Amendment mandates
the right to counsel at the presentence interview, it is incumbent
upon defense attorneys to develop a good working relationship
with probation officers. "The most obvious impediment to a suc-
cessful and productive relationship between probation officers and
defense attorneys relates to how each professional perceives the
other. . . . It is critical, for the benefit of the criminal justice sys-
tem, for defense attorneys and probation officers to share a com-
mon ground. 2 2
Additionally, defense counsel must consult with the defendant
prior to the interview. Counsel must impress upon the defendant
the importance of the interview and stress the consequences of va-
rious actions and omissions. In short, the defense attorney must
make certain the defendant knows what the relevant facts in his
case are and what the probation officer will be looking for. The
more prepared the defendant is, the less likely the interview will
result in prejudice. Moreover, because the determinations of ac-
ceptance of responsibility, obstruction of justice, and other Guide-
lines adjustments will be based on the interview, the attorney
should arrange to be present with his client at the presentence
interview.263
In addition, the defense attorney must read the presentence re-
port and be alert for any facts with which he disagrees. Opportuni-
ties are available to object to the contents of the report and de-
fense counsel should take advantage of these if necessary.264
Ensuring that the facts presented in the report are accurate will
help ensure that the defendant receives the fairest possible
sentence.
CONCLUSION
Because the information in the presentence report is directly
correlative to the sentence received under the Guidelines, the na-
262. Weintraub, supra note 221, at 29.
263. See Kuh, supra note 62, at 434-35.
264. Carroll, supra note 116, at 989 (noting that the defense lawyer can have a significant
impact on the presentence investigation process and its subsequent effect on the client by
making timely attacks on erroneous information in the report).
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ture of the presentence interview from which the information is
derived has changed significantly since the enactment of the
Guidelines. A close examination of the Supreme Court's critical-
stage analysis reveals that the Court's main concern in determining
whether a stage is critical is its inherent potential for prejudice,
intentional or not, which the presence of counsel can avert.26 5 Even
if the Court imposes the additional requirement that a critical
stage be adversarial in nature, the reality of the probation officer's
role as an adversary supports a finding that the presentence inter-
view qualifies as a critical stage.
Even after a criminal defendant has been convicted or pled
guilty, the Constitution demands continued fair treatment by the
criminal justice system. Therefore, the Supreme Court has deter-
mined that the defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel at
every critical stage in the proceedings, including sentencing. In the
federal sentencing structure, the presentence interview is a critical
stage at which the defendant is entitled to the assistance of
counsel. 6
Upon extending the right to counsel to the presentence inter-
view, the Constitution demands either the presence of counsel at
the interview or an effective waiver of the right by the defendant.
Mere failure to request the presence of counsel should not suffice.
Practically, the constitutional guarantee would not be difficult to
implement, nor would it place an undue burden on the probation
department or the courts. The Constitution and the fairness con-
cerns that prompted Congress to enact the Guidelines demand uni-
form provision of the right to counsel at presentence interviews in
the federal criminal justice system.
Megan E. Burns
265. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967).
266. An attorney m the Federal Defender's Office in San Diego stated that "it's insane to
think [the presentence interview] is not a critical stage." Swain Interview, supra note 3.
When asked why the circuit courts have refused to recognize the interview as a critical
stage, he speculated that the federal appellate courts are so far removed from the trenches
that they cannot understand the impact of the interview. Id.
